Defense of Christianity, part 4, the nature of truth and postmodernism

Today I am going to talk briefly about the existence and nature of truth. First, let us introduce the correspondence theory of truth. The correspondence theory holds that truth is some sort of proposition that corresponds to reality.

Now that we've gotten that out of the way, let us talk shortly about truth relativism vs. truth absolutism. Truth relativists say that truth is relative to individuals or specific communities, while truth absolutists say that truth is absolute and transcends individuals and communities.

There is an obvious reason for truth absolutism over truth relativism. Simply put, relativism is self-refuting. To say that "truth is relative" is either true or false in the absolute sense. If it is true in the absolute sense, then it is self-refuting because it amounts to the absolutist claim that there is no absolute truth.

If the latter, then it becomes meaningless. One certainly cannot recommend truth relativism to anyone else without presupposing its truth in the absolutist sense.

This dialectical objection to truth relativism will be very important as we assess the debate between realists and postmodernists over the existence and nature of truth.

Our second response is more of an undercutting defeater for relativism, in that relativists confuse many things, including the relationship between truths and propositions. Truth conditions are things which make a proposition true, and truth criteria are those methods we use to discern truth. Truth relativists often confuse these

Our final response focuses on the law of noncontradiction, the law of the excluded middle, and the law of identity. Postmodernists often call these western, Aristotelian constructs. But surely this is not the case, for any statement which asserts their falsity would be either self-defeating or be completely meaningless.

Let us turn to another theory of truth, the redundancy theory of truth. The advocates of this theory say that Truth doesn't really exist, but rather is just a way of expressing agreement with an assertion. For instance, the statement T "It is true that Lincoln is dead" is equal to statement U "Lincoln is dead".

However, we can object to this theory on two grounds

1: People experience truth, and if this is so, then truth exists and the redundancy theory is to be rejected. People appeal to U to know whether Abraham Lincoln lived, died, etc, but people appeal to T to organize their beliefs in a coherent manner

2: U and T are not equal. The Statement "Lincoln is dead" is a statement about Lincoln, but the statement "It is true that Lincoln is dead" is a statement about the proposition "Lincoln is dead"

Let's take a fuller look at correspondence theory now that we have covered the redundancy theory of truth. Within correspondence theory, there are truth bearers, and truth makers. Truth bearers are simply truths. They are either statements, mental states, or propositions. Truth makers on the other hand make these truth bearers true.

Let's take a look at statements as truth bearers. The problem is that a truth bearer cannot be true or false if it is meaningless. But of course there are meaningless and meaningful statements. One may wish to resolve this by saying that it is the content of the statements which make them true or false. But the person who responds in this manner saws the branch he is sitting on, for he has moved away from the linguistic content towards the propositional theory of truth bearers.

Let's take a look at mental states as truth bearers. These seem to hold the upper hand over statements and sentences as truth bearers because only statements which reflect mental states can be counted as true or false. Second, one can have true or false beliefs without thinking in language.

But these have problems because it is not the mental state itself which is true or false because even mental states can be meaningless. Say one person has a thought that the grass is green and then this thought passes away after an instant. This is surely meaningless. When mental states are considered by themselves, they don't have meaning. It is the content of those mental states which makes them true or false.

We seem to only be left with truth bearers as propositions. What is a proposition? Well of course there is no definitive answer, but we know that they are 1: Not located in space or time, 2: not identical to linguistic sentences or statements which express them, 3: not sense perceptible, 4: that they can be in more than one mind at once, need not be grasped by any person to exist, may be objects of thought, and are not physical entities.

So now that we've covered truth-bearers, what are truh makers? Simply put, they are facts or states of affairs. Truth makers make truth bearers true because of intentionality. Truth makers certainly do not cause truth bearers to be true

Some counterexamples have been given to undermine this relationship

1: Baal does not exist

2: Dinosaurs are extinct

3: All ravens are black

4: Loving a child is morally right

5: The U.S. President in 2070 will be a woman

6: If Jones were rich, he would buy a Lexus

2 responses are given

1: Abandon truth maker maximalism. This is where the correspondence theorist says that most, but not all truths have truth makers

2: Find what the truth makers for these statements are

It seems that the second is the best one

Consider the first one. The truth maker is simply that of all the states of affairs that obtain, none of them is "Baal exists"

Consider the second one. The truth maker is simply that there were dinosaurs many years ago, but none today

Consider the third one. It is a universally quantified statement, and as such, it applies to all ravens, both actual and possible, and not those that just happen to exist. The truth maker seems to be the proposition "if something is a raven, then it is black".

The fourth one is a proposition of morality that doesn't imply that children exist or are being loved. So what is the truth maker? It seems that there is an action, which is Loving a child, that has the property of being morally right

The fifth one is a future tense statement. Let's grant for the sake of argument that the president in 2070 will be a woman. It seems to be true now, even if the election hasn't taken place

One strategy involves eliminating tense, whereas a state of affairs obtains, tenselessly, where the president in 2070 is a woman

The second strategy retains tense, where the state of affairs "The US president is a woman" obtains in the future, specifically 2070.

For 6, it seems that a counterfactual state of affairs, where If X then Y, is the truth bearer for "If Jones were rich, he'd buy a Lexus"

Now that we've covered that, let's move onto the correspondence relation. Simply put, it is not a property, but rather an intentional object between a state of affairs and a proposition.

Now that we've covered that, let's actually give 2 arguments in favor of correspondence theory of truth. First , a phenomoneological argument seems to support it.

The example just cited presents a clear case where truth is experienced, and where the intentional object is a sense-perceptible one, that being a book in the bookstore. But it need not be the case that object be sense-perceptible. You can "see" the truth of modus ponens in certain logical inferences.

Some reject the argument on the grounds that it is simplistic. Now while it is simple, it is not simplistic because more complex cases where philosophers, scientists, or mathematicians experience truth. Moreover, it is a virtue of a theory to accord with how we actually experience truth.

The second argument is the dialectical argument, namely that people presuppose it in their arguments against it. For instance, the pragmatic theory. It is true that truth is just redundant. If they say that their arguments are not true in the correspondence sense, then their statements are meaningless.

3 objections have been given to the correspondence theory

1: That there isn't a highly developed theory of the 3 entities in the correspondence theory. We could respond to this by either A: Pointing out that all that follows from this is that more work needs to be done on the theory, or B: That our analysis above seems to be on the right track

2: That by drawing a dichotomy between truth and evidence, one can have all the evidence, but not the truth. But 2 things may be said in response

1: It only follows that we cannot attain truth if we grant it

2: it IS the case that evidence is not the same thing as truth. So this turns out to be a virtue on the part of the correspondence theory

3: Finally, some say that the correspondence theory predicts queer entities, like propositions, irreducible intentionality, the correspondence relation, etc.

But its hard to see the force in this argument. The "mystery" of an entity isn't enough to reject it. Furthermore, these seem to be commonsensical, not mysterious, as we saw in the phenomenological argument.

Now that we've covered the correspondence theory, let's talk briefly about the Coherence theory of truth. Coherence theory is the statement that a belief is true if it coheres with one's entire set of beliefs.

There's a difference between the coherence theory of truth and the theory of justification. The latter is compatible with a correspondence view of truth, but the former is not.

One problem with this theory is that there really isn't a very specific definition of "coherence".

The main argument for coherence theory of truth is to adhere to the coherence theory of justification and avoid skepticism. On the correspondence theory, one may have highly justified, but false beliefs. Not so on the coherence theory of truth.

The major problems for this theory are the fact that there is no such thing as a justified false belief, since justification and truth are identical. Some claim this to be a virtue, but it is a problem because it is often the case that people have justified, though false beliefs. Some may define appropriate justification as truth to avoid this, but this begs the question.

The next problem is that it allows for completely contradictory sets of beliefs that are coherent.

You could respond by saying that coherence theory of truth is a form of relativism, but the problem is that truth relativism amounts to the absolute claim that truth is relative.

Finally, we saw in the phenomenological argument that people learn truths through experience, not by comparing them to their entire web of beliefs.

The last theory of truth we will assess is the pragmatic theory of truth, where a belief is true if and only if it is useful to have that belief.

Some define pragmatism in a non-epistemic way, whereas acceptance leads to greater happiness, less suffering, etc. and others in an epistemic way.

For the latter, belief P is true only if one's colleagues let them assert it rationally, or one is justified in asserting it, that it exemplifies simplicity, etc.

The problem of course is that this is self-refuting because pragmatists do not advocate their view on the view that it is pragmatic to hold to the pragmatic theory of truth, but that it corresponds to certain facts about language or science etc.

We've seen that the correspondence theory holds the high ground in regards to various theories of truth. Let us turn to an assessment of postmodernism. It is short, sweet, and to the point because of the fact that it isn't entirely necessary, as Non-chrsitians here on youtube and the rest of the internet are far and away comprised more of scientific naturalists than postmodern antirealists.

In regards to metaphysics, they regard "reality" as a social construction.

In regards to truth, they deny the correspondence theory of truth. Moreover, they reject so-called "dichotomous thinking" which groups things into areas like good/evil, beautiful/ugly, right/wrong, irrational/rational, etc.

In regards to rationality, they reject the fact of normativity and over-arching "rationality"

In regards to justification, they reject foundationalism

They also hold to a form of nominalism, whereas they reject the existence of universal properties. They also reject the idea that there is a difference between some thing's essential properties and accidental properties. For instance, a roof is an essential property of a house, and the color of paint used is an accidental property. Postmodernists reject this idea

In regards to the philosophy of language, they do not hold that it has any real meaning or authority. Finally, there are no metanarratives.

It seems obvious on the face of it that post-modernism is self-refuting. They make absolute claims of relativism.